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CUTTING VS. CHAyEZ RE-EXAMINED:
A COMMENTARY ON PICKENS' ANALYSIS

T. PffiLLIP WOLF

As

New Mexican, a persistent student of New Mexico polities, and a one-time professor to the author, 1 welcomed the
opportunity to read "Bronson Cutting vs. Dennis Chavez: Battle
of the Patrones in New Mexico, 1934" by William H. Pickens.!
As I examined the article,· my enthusiasm waned in the face of
basic weaknesses in it: seemingly questionable assumptions,
faulty logic, and doubtful assertions. For these reasons, which I
assume may be shared by others or at least of interest to them, I've
written this commentary. It is not an attack on my friend Bill
Pickens but an attempt to clarify key elements in his paper. I
. would expect a similar response from him if our positions were
.
reversed. I welcome his reaction to niycomments.
The main thrust of my positioIi is that Pickens does not effectively refute the several prior commentaries on the 1934 U.S.
Senatorial election in New Mexico. His evidence and argument
in no way seriously undermine those previous explanations which
at critIcal· points are as plausible, and· generally more plausible,
than the new version Pickens offers. With few exceptions I do not
introduce new evidence; Instead I rely on the material presented
in the article. Generally I do not question the data but contest the
inferences made from those data and the assumptions with which
Pickens shapes his presentation.
. There are two implicit factors that structure the article. I) The
motives and strategies of the main contestants: Senator Bronson
Cutting, Congressman Dennis Chavez, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the Republican Old Guard, and Democratic Party
A FORMER
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leaders. To put it differently, Pickens' research rests on several
.• iniplicitassumptions about the behavior of pOlitical elites. For
example, why did Cutting oppose the Republican Old Guard?
Why did that group resist Cutting? Why did Chavez run against
Cutting rather than oppose Carl Hatch iIi the nominating convention? Why did President Roosevelt endorse Chavez rather
than Cutting? How would Democratic leaders have responded if
Chavez or Roosevelt had reacted differently to the situation? 2)
Pickens also makes assumptions about voters and their behavior.
In this commentary, the most sustained criticism of Pickens'
research is directed at factor I. FaCtor 2-is dealt with briefly. Other
miscellaneous problems are also examined. -

BEHAVIOR OF POLITICAL ELITES

PICKENS persistently confuses the customary with the unusual. In
fact, he reverses those positions, asserting the exception as the
rule and the deviation as the expected. In so doing he displays a
marked naivete about, or at least lack of familiarity with, American politics. (He offers no evidence that New Mexico is an exception to the national pattern on these matters.) There are at
least five instances of this confusion.
First, Pickens is either uninformed about or insensitive to the
ordinary relations between presidents and members of Congress
in electoral situations. He is puzzled by Franklin Roosevelt's en~
dorsement of Chavez. 2 A more understandable cause for perplexity
would have been a Roosevelt endorsement of Cutting. The cus~
tomary pattern is for presidents to endorse members of their party
running for Congress, especially if they are incumbents, or at least
to maintain neutrality. The rare occasions in recent decades when
a president deviated from that pattern were newsworthy precisely
because they were rare. -Roosevelt's attempted purge in 1938 is
probably the rilOSt renowned example. Another case is Richard
Nixon's support for James Buckley of the New York Conservative
Party in 1970. Roosevelt did not repeat the 1938 strategy. Nixon
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cautiously waited until it was clear,. from opinion polls, that the
Republican incumbent Charles Goodell could. not be elected.
Nixon's only choice was between Buckley and the Democrat
Ottinger.. Goodell trailed so badly that a Nixon endorsement
could not have made Goodell competitive. But Nixon could
hope to block Ottinger, who had a liberal record in Congress, and
to appear (to the uninformed) to purge GoodelP Both the 1938
and 1970 presidential attempts to defeat incumbents of their own
party illustrate the unus~al circumstances of that strategy.
Why do presidents customarily either endorse their party's
candidate or remain aloof in congressional elections? That question
leads to the article's second area of naivete about American politics. The main reason that presidents do not endorse opposition
party candidates is that chief executives risk ~uch for little gain
by that action. Congress lacks the rigid party discipline found in
the British House of Commons but party affiliation is nonetheless
the most reliable clue to voting behavior in the United States
Congress. Although one cannot predict individual legislator behavior, it is clearly probable that most Democrats will oppose a
majority of the Republicans on highly contested issues. Over the
last quarter century several studies have reported this pattern!
Presidents may not be aware of the details of these studies but
they do recognize they get more support from members of their
party than from those ofthe opposition. Presidents are also aware
that incumbents have a marked advantage in getting re-elected.
This means that a president cannot critically influence the outcome of most congressio~al elections. Presidents are also sensitive
to the prerogatives of Congress, including the likelihood that many
members of Congress will resent presidential interference to defeat a member. Thus to encourage members of his own party to
vote with the party and to avoid Congressional reprisals, a president ordinarily supports the electoral efforts of his party's candidates. To oppose Dennis Chavez in 1934, Franklin Roosevelt ran
the double risk of engendering his fellow Democrat's opposition
on any action that might transpire before Chavez's House term
expired and the future antagonism of Chavez, whose youth and
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popularity made him a·likely ultimate winner if not in 1934. With
large DemocratiC majorities in both national chambers in 1934,
an endorserrient of Cutting would-likely have raised apprehension
that FDR might attempt
purge sitting members -of Congress.
Wouldn't that be the next step if the President were successful in
blocking the move of a Representative to the Senate? Pickens
properly makes rnuch ofChavez'sJoyalty. To have endorsed Cutting,FDR would have offended a loyal party member (and the
member's following) in order to gainfavor with Cutting whose
political fickleness was well established. 5 Without evidence that
Cutting supported Rooseveltian policies more persistently than
Chavez it is incredible to expect. Roosevelt to have considered
. - _-,
backingCutting.
- - - _.
Thirdly, Pickens errs in regarding ·Chavez's support for John
Garner's 1932. presidential nomination bid as substantial grounds
for· FDRto oppose- Chavez. -Again Pickens misunderstands
American politics. Roosevelt could readily understand that Chavez
would back Garner, a Southwesterner like Chavez, and the most
powerful member of the House, whocOlild provide incomparable
assistance to the freshman congressman. There were _innumerable
ways in which Garner could help Chavez whether the Texan won
the nomination or not. Roosevelt, a skilled practitioner of backscratching and trading off, -could ,- accept these interactions. If
FDR could invite Garner; to be his. vice-presidential mate, he
could certainly forgive Chavez for backing Garner. Similar unlikely unions were made by Stevenson and Kefauver in -1956, Kennedy and Johnson in 1960, and Nixon and Agnew; an early
Rockefeller devotee; in 1968. Of course I'm speaking of the general burying-the-hatchet accommodation. that .follows presidential
nominations: It is possible there was unresolved animosity between Roosevelt and' Chavez, -but Pickens gives no evidence -of
marked hostility after the 1932. convention. Moreover, nothing is
offered to demonstrate that Chavez failed to .support FDR's
election and subsequent administration. On the contrary, wasn't
Chavez's support enthusiastic in both instances?

to
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, , Fourthly,Pich~ns' :statement thitthis' contest "undoubtedly
plagued Roosevelt" ,(po 28) suggests a failure 'to .grasp the priorities of presidential concern. qhlessPickens can produce specific
evidence on this point one can w~ll dis'iniss "it. It is implausible. A
president can hardly.fret over each of the 'more than five. huridn:id
elections, for members~f the' Congressional chambers; especially
one in a small, poor, and relativelyinsignificant state such as New
.Mexico.. Moreover,' as.suJ:TI.ing one:fin'ds Cutting's' campaign
speeches morec9ngenial to the :New Deal than those 6fChavez
, (a view I am not willing to concede except to illustrate thepoirit
at hand); FDHwas sufficiently sophisticated not to be misled by
political rhetoric. The Ptesfdent ~imselfwas frequently criticized
on·, those grounds: he seem:ed :conseI\Tative to the reformers 'and
radical to thest,andpatters. FpR was moved by votes for his
,prog~ains not by~ampaign oratory. As long as that oratory was not
, an attack on the President h.imself,he was l.lIllih~ly to object" to
campaign pleas by Chavez ,llJ?d other'Democrats. 'None 6fthe
excerpts from, Chavez'sspeeches in the article indicate an attack
',' on the President. Thus Piekens erects a straw
One should
,not be surprised that Roosevelt eIidorsed Chavez. :'Rather one is
astonished thai: a scholar would find that unusual and noieworthy.6
,Fjn~lly, Pickens is misdirected in his views about the advantages to Chavez of challenging Senator Cad Hatch I:ither th~m
, Senator Bronson Cutting Cpp: 6~md 26). By Pickens' own accOunt,
Chavez was noted for his loyalty to· the party and', the' party
, regulars. To, have challenged Hitch would have split the DemocratiC Party. After all, Hatch must havehad some support oihe
would not have been appointed Sen:itor (and elected in' 1934).
At the same time, Chavez would have undermined one of his basic
strengths: his record of loyal work for the party and its leaders.
Moreover, if Hatch was a weak cartdidate (as Pickens contends),
to defeat him for the convention nominatIon would hardly enhance Chavez's reputation as a political,leider. In contrast, the
contest with Cutting hadinultiple·advantages. Chavez could have
,the nomination without a struggle. If he defeated Cutting, Chavez

man.
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augmented his political eminence (or "clout" in the current argot)
and weakened his chief rival-for' leadership of the Spanish-speaking'voters. If 'he lost, he 'could run again for major office (he was
not yet forty)' By running in 1934 he established prior claim to
Cutting's seat when it became vacant. Moreover, Chavez added
to his already impressive credentials as a loyal party regular: He
was forsaking a safe House seat to provide the-only formidable
competition to Cutting that his party could offer. The unchallenged leadership of the Spanish-speaking bloc is significant; this
was Dennis Chavez's role for the next three decades. Until his
death Senator Chavez jealously protected his' pre-eminence with
his people, refusing to share that status even with fellow Hispano
leaders. (As Senator Joseph Montoya might well confirm.) On
this point as well, Pickens' revisionist interpretation is less
persuasive than the previous explanations on this point.
To salvage his argument, Pickens must provide documentation
that Roosevelt was "plagued" by his failure to endorse Cutting;
that FDR held a grudge against Chavez for backing Garner in
1932; and that FDR perceived Cutting to be more valuable to
the New Deal than was Chavez. Without such evidence, one
must assume that the actions of Chavez and Roosevelt were predictable. Both responded in amanneI' that was supportive of New
Deal programs and satisfying to Democratic party -leaders. Certainly, FDR was not one to sacrifice'all for party loyalty but he
did know that legislative success depended upon substantial
backing by Congressional Democrats. He did not require Democratic unanimity, but widespread party support was essential. Thu~
he conformed to established political norms and endorsed Chavet.
In turn Chavez, a proven patty man, did not damage the accepted
view of that role by challenging Hatch, a fellow Democrat,for a
Senate seat. Party leaders are especially sensitive to open factionalism, public displays of disunity and disharmony. Evidence of this
is found in every election year, in national and subnational
campaigns. Correctly or not, party leaders believe that voters are
offended by party disunity and that a party must keep its house in
orqer if it is to be successful and not waste its energies. Intense
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nomination contests increase costs in all areas : monetary, personnel, and psychological commitments. Party leaders. do not
place party harmony above ,all other considerations but they 'give
it a high priority. In 1934 Democratic party leaders should have
welcomed Chavez's challenge of Cutting and Roosevelt's endorsement of Chavez.
If Pickens' implicit assumptions about Democratic party leaders
are unconvincing, his discussion of Republican factionalism is
mind-boggling. Every segment of that discussion is weak. For
example, ,Pickens entraps himself in a non sequitur on page 14:
He cites Andrea Parker to the effect that (A) Bronson Cutting
used the Labor Commissioner as an excuse to break with the
Republican Party (or ii~ Old Guard). From that it is concluded
(B) "Such a view insists· that the Old Guard cared little about the
substance of the bill . . . but they wanted Cutting dispatched
to Washington." Thus from Cutting's motives (A} Pickers determines the motives of Cutting's opponents (B). That line 'of
thought is clearly illogical. In fact, the, opposition conclusion
seems as plausible: If, as Parker says; Cutting was using the Labor
Commissioner issue as a strategic device, (and thus "cared little
about" its basic merits), he'would hardly pick an issue on which
the Old Guard was ·indifferent. It seems mOre likely that Cutting
would pick an issue on which the Old Guard would take a.stand
and persist. Why did the Old Guard fight if they were relatively
unconcerned about the issue? Pickens' can hardly maintain that
Cutting saw the substantive issue to be trivial "since Pickens· has
employed that issue to,,;gemonstrate the purity and consistency of
Cutting's progressive ideology. (One difficulty with this first full
paragraph on page 14 is that it is not 'clear that the phrase "Such
a view insists" refers to Parker's position orfic'kens' interpretation
of that position. In any case, it is 'incumbent on Pickens to note
the logical inconsistency and clarify it.)
.
In the next paragraph, Pickens delivers another puzzle when
he refers to the shrewdness of Republicans in averting factionalism prior to 1928. There are, two general defects ,in that contention: That Republicans in prior, years had not been plagued by

'r",'.'
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factionalism is not nece~sarilydue to shrewdness. There may not
have been sufficiently controversial issues to split the 'party in its
previous periods of dominance. (That-is,jf one grants a relative
absence of factionalism in the earlier periods.) To put it differently, homogeneity of outlook or interest may have precluded a
schismatic GOP before. Certainly Pickens cites no evidence th~t
demonstrates the shrewdness or even what he means by that tenp.
Moreover the Republican dominance of 1913 .(cited in footnote
33) is not comparable to that of. 1929. Unlike 1928, in 1912
Republicans'lost the White House and did not gain control of the
state house (governor). Thus the 1912 victory was partial, not
complete 'from precinct to White House, as in 1928. On both
points then the argument is weak: No explanation of shrewdness
by Republicans is .presented. : Moreover, with control of the
presidency and governorship, the patronage available after '1928
offered far greater occasions for party divisiveness than in the
aftermath of 1912.
Pickens does stress "legislative history" in making ,his comparison, but a discussion of party factionalism cannot exclude the
impact of the executive branch, especially in New Mexico where
interference from Washington and the governor have often been
critical. Only by restricting his focus to the state legislatmecan
Pickens maintain that the degree of Republican dominanc;e was
as greatin 1913 as in 1929. If that restriction is made, then the
impact of Congress, including Senator, Cutting, would have to be
excluded. Certainly that cannot be done. Contrary to Pickens'
evaluation, there was a greater degree of Republican dominance
in New Mexico after, 1928 than in 1912. Whether this condition
contributed to Republican factionalism cannot be ascertained from
the material Pickens presents, but the increased opportunities for
patronage seem a plausible source of factionalism manifested in
the Cutting-Old Guard squabble.
Pickens moves on to speculate about, the choice of issue on
which Cutting and the Republican Old Guard feU out. Previous
interpretations regard the Labor Commissioner bill as primarily
a power struggle. 7 Pickens contends that several other issues during
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t4eSession, were' equally controversial. Moreover thesematter.s
Were' better arenas for a factional struggle since they did not .involve "ext~n.sive institutional additions or seeming 'class'legislation." Cp: 15) One could as plausibly argue, contrary to Pickens,
tllat these characteristics made the Labor Commissioner question
distinctive and one OIl which the Old'Guard would fight With a
legislative history in which numerous constitutional amendments
havebeenpreseiited to the electorate, the, 1929 ,legislature was
unlikely to be deterred by the bill 'because it required '~extensive
institutional additions." Ceitainlyone can hypothesize that this
consideration made the Labor Commissioner bill an unlikely focus
fot a struggle to control the state Republican party, but the test of
thai hypothesis is imempirical one. Regardless of speculation by
Pickens (or by Wolf) such hypothesizing can only be verified by
the actions taken andaccotints"as to why these actions occurred.
What did first~hand observers of the situation have to say? Not
only about the Labor Commissioner bill but the viability of the
several other issues as alternative contexts for a party power struggle? By their own accounts 'how did the Old Guard perceive the
controversy? Pickens doesn'ttell tis but surely there must be some
, material that would indicate the motives of the contestants. Once
again, Pickens has not marshalled the data to confirm his specula, tion. (What I have ci.-iticized here does not resolve the matter of
motives behind the Labor Commissioner bill struggle. It does
show that Pickens has'not satisfactorily clarified the matter.) ,
PERCEPTIONS OF AND BY THE PUBLIC

PICKENS' firial thrust on the Labor Commissioner battle explores
the· reasons that Spanish-surnamed'legislators gave overwhelming
backing for this legislatjon. Since their constituents were primarily
rural and agrarian why would they endorse this legislation which
would be of little immediate benefit to their electors? Pickens
decides they supported 'the bill because they saw it to be a step
toward a programmatic approacp to help all lower income groups,
Spanish-speaking 'and Anglo. "How else can the solid Spanish-
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speaking' vote in the legislature .; . be explained?" (p. 15)
Once more Pickens offers speculation but no evidence to connrm
that-Yet an alternative interpretation can be supported by Pickens'
paper: Cutting was highly popular with Spanish-American voters
and their political representatives. On page 1 I, Pickens eloquently
attests this relationship:, Spanish-Americans "adored'" Cutting,
who "employed" them,' "fought for their candidates, and conversed in their tongue." (And. it might be added, loaned them
money. Weren't stacks of promissory notes, cancellable upon his
death, found in Cutting's papers?) This affinity to Cutting combined with the tradition ofpatrones in Spanish-speaking precincts
is a straightforward explanation of the Spanish-American legislative bloc's votes for the Labor Commissioner bill. Cutting wanted
the bill. He was popular with the Spanish-American legislators
and.their constituents~ Therefore the legislators voted for the bill.
Moreover this explanation is parsimonious and· consistent with
the evidence Pickens himself uses. Because of its evidential basis
one must prefer this explanation to Pickens' programmatic or
ideological one unless and until evidence is uncovered that indicates these legislators perceived the issue in the programmatic
manner Pickens suggests. The patronal explanation' I present
would also be weakened if it could be demonstrated that on other
legislation sponsored. by Cutting the. Spanish-American legislative
bloc did not persistently follow his lead. Again Pickens fails the
empirical test and in this instance a more plaUSible explanation is
buttressed by other information in the paper.
The argument is not only weak in explaining support for the
Labor Commissioner bill; the interpretation of the sources of opposition is also dubious. On page 14 Pickens asserts that Republicans feared to express sympathy for labor because that would "lose
them (Republicans) the votes of wealthy New Mexicans." Even
in 1928-1934, there were more votes from labor than from wealthy
.New Mexicans. What the GOP stood. to lose was not votes but
money; campaign funds which labor could not match. It may have
been (or at least presumed) that the Republican forces could not
prevail.without large contributions. which ultimately would be
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translatable into votes.. Nonetheless the .critical asset of wealthy
New Mexicans was not their numbers but the amount of campaign funds they could generate: There have never been many
wealthy New Mexicans iIi proportion to .thestate's population.
Another role of the wealthy is that of opinion leadership. They
may serve as reference points from which other .citizens get clues
for their own preferences. on policies and .candidates. Thus the
wealthy as opinion leaders, indirectly influence many votes.
Whether wealthy New Mexicans are conceptualized-as a source
of campaign funds or as a pool of opinion leaders, it is not their
votes that are their crucial asset in a campaign calculus,. it is their
potential (money.and opinion leadership)for influencing other
voters,S
In examining support and opposition to the Labor Commissioner
bill, Pickens implies that both the Spanish-American legislative
bloc and the Republican Old Guard were oriented primarily:toward the electorate, either their specific constituents (the SpanlshAmericans) or a more general segment of the public (wealthy
New Mexicans). It is unlikely that the influences 'on legislators
are unidimensional. Probably the personal ideological preferences
of the legislators as well as interest-group pressures and poli~ical
leadership also were factors in this legislative decision. This is. a
minor criticism but deserves .mention in emphasizing the complexity of legislative decision making. The tradition of legislative
politics in New Mexico, if.one is to believe the press, is one in
which interest groups have a prominent role. Pickens notes the
endorsements of organized labor in the 1934 U.S.' Senatorial
campaign (p. 34, fn. 60) but does indicate the impact of pressure
groups in the legislature. Here it appears Pickens could have
strengthened his case by stressing Cutting's leadership which
linked together constituency (at least for Spanish-American legislators) and interest-group (labor) factors.
Perhaps the most egregious. assertion Pickens makes is in his
conclusion: "Yet the public perceived no erratic experimenter in
Cutting. Rather they saw a. man of consistent vision who had
finally Come into·his own." (p. 29) If there is a sweeping assertion
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inthepaper it is this. Yet this statement~eems to be the least
defensible evaluation in the article. Apparently, Pickens reaches
his conclusion. about the public's view of Cutting from the 1934
election results. Numerous studies of voting behavior demonstrate
that election results alone rarely give direct' clues as to why
citizens voted as they dId, or-how they perceive candidates. Thus
public _opinion studies in the 1950'S showed the public (at least
,its majority) was persistently incorrect and uninfoiined about
President Eisenhower's stands on issues. (And about Governor
Stevenson's views as welL) Moreover, they apparently were unconcerned that they lacked or misperceived this infor:mation.
Similarly,. in 1968 when Senator Eugene McCarthy challenged
President Johnson, more voters than not misperceived McCarthy's
views on Vietnam. Yetthis issue was the heart of the Senator's
campaign. 9
If one were to concede for· the sake of argument that the
electorate did correctly perceive and react to Cutting's ideology,
the assertion that Pickens makes would· still he questionable. Since
the election was ch)se, unless this ideological mattetwas the only
determinant of the election it would be unwise to characterize the
. publi~ as Pickens does.It se~msreasonablethatChavez voters did
not support him ,because they 'found Cutting's ideology compelling~ Moreover some votes for Cutfing were cast despite his
ideology but because he was a Repub.Jican. The electoral calculus
runs along these lines: Nearly half the voters went for Chavez
and thus were not moved by Cutting's poliCies; some voters supported Cutting because, he was a Republican/o others responded
fayorablytohispersonal qualities as distinCt from his policy stands.
. The remainder, most certainly a minority of the public; might have
been moved by his Ideological appeal. Thus if Cutting's ideology
was correctly understood it probably influenced less than a majority of the electorate. That harqly peimits oIle to refer to the
public's viewof Cutting's "consistentvision." .
.
... If Pickens does not base ihis assertion on the election outcome,
it must be on some other evidence 6f the 'electorate's perception of
Cutting. Such other evidence is not offered in support of the as-
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sertion. In those days before the extensive use of opinion surveys
it would be difficult to compile information representative of the
New Mexico electorate's opinions and preferences. Certainly
newspaper editorials and commentary cannot be used as valid
manifestations of the public's views.

MISCELLANEOUS

As A FOLLOWUP to this discussion of ideology, Pickens' unusual
assessment of the general political philosophies of the 1934 contestants deserves comment. The article both underplays Chavez's
political philosophy and seemingly exaggerates Cutting's or at
least its significance. On page 28 we find, "Chavez had no real
philosophy of government; he was a man who liked popular projects. Time
after time he stressed that he would back what the
I
.
people wanted." Isn't the latter a philosophy of government? If
not a philosophy of government, what would one call being sensitive to the wishes of constituents and reacting positively (responsibly) to those wishes? Isn't that essentially what the young
adult protests in recent years, particularly opposing U.S. policy
in Southeast Asia, were about, i.e., making government more
responsive to popular will? Wasn't it a tenet of Populism that
government should not be dominated by aristocrats and the afHu-.
ent (or socioeconomic elites, as social scientists say today) but it
should yield to public demand? Perhaps Populism was a grab bag
of principles, some of which were incompatible with each other,
but it was none the less a philosophy of governing. Pickens' characterization of Chavez resurrects an enduring controversy of
politics: Should elected officials primarily reRect the views of their
constituents or should they exercise their own judgment even if
that is contrary to :their constituents' desires? That controversy is
eloquently presented in Edmund Burke's famous speech to the
electors of Bristol. It persists today in the conceptualization by
political scientists that legislators perform either "trustee" or
"delegate" roles or a mixture of the two.
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This dismissal (or nonrecognition) of the Populist or delegate.
basis of Chavez's political philosophy leads Pickens to at least one
error of logic. It may be that statements lauding the constitution
and the will of the people make superficial campaigns, but to assert
that "such statements indicated he (Chavez) held the opinions of
the Old Barons about public authority" (p. 18) is a non sequitur.
It may be that those persons imbued Chavez with the tools and
wisdom of his political trade, but defense of the constitution and
popular sovereignty in no way make Chavez distinctive. Can we
cite any American politician who would deny these principles? I
doubt it. Moreover the espousal of these values is consistent with
a Populist philosophy and the "practical values" of fighting for
jobs and benefits that are recounted on page 19. As Pickens notes,
the upshot of these efforts may have been to stress New Mexico's
interests rather than a national perspective. But that emphasis is a
defensible, even acceptable, view of representation. That Pickens
(and Wolf) might disagree with this view makes it no less an
acceptable philosophy of government. The desirability of a regional versus a national perspective is another durable issue of political
representation. l l If a representative does not promote the interests
of his constituents who will? All elected officials have some responsibility for the nation as a whole but their primary representative function must be for the voters in their district.
Another theme to which Pickens refers is patronage politics,
including nepotism. (fn. 63, p. 35.) Although it may not be
consonant with contemporary middle-class values it is certainly a
philosophy of government. The philosophy and practice of rewarding friends and family while denying aid to one's opponents
has a long history in American politics. It is symbolized by the
political boss, a distinctive American contribution to the political
institutions of democracy. It is certainly consistent with the folklore and implicit philosophy of much New Mexico politics, as well
as the career of President Andrew Jackson, to mention only one
example from the broader spectrum of our political heritage.
The thrust of these comments is not to defend the political
philosophy of Dennis Chavez but to note that the charge he lacked
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one is not supported by the evidence and argument in the article.
Espousal of the Constitution and constituents' interests, as well
as emphasis on local matters over national issues are valid elements
of a political philosophy.12 Patronage politics are also compatible
with a particular political philosophy. It is one which many of
us reject but a philosophy none the less.
The contention that Cutting had a political philosophy, moreover a consistent one, rests largely on the exploration of one issue:
the labor commissioner proposal. To be sure, other issues are .
mentioned: a veterans' bureau Cp. 8), tariff, conservation, and
state ownership of public lands Cp. 9), deficit spending and public
works Cp. 20), organized lcibor Cp. 22), and federal aid to education Cfn. 69), but one could hardly term these a consistent
political philosophy"since they are insufficiently examined. More
directly, one can admit that Cutting had a political philosophy,
but the details of that and its internal consistency, as well as continuity over time, are not adequately elaborated. This article does
not demonstrate the conclusion that Cutting's political appeal was
primarily ideological. On the contrary, this paper, as well as the
general aura about Cutting, indicates his appeal was a mixture of
ideology, personal leadership, and patronage, but mainly a distinctive New Mexico version of friends-and-neighbors politicking
that was based substantially on Spanish-speaking supporters.
Did Cutting come to be "a national figure to be reckoned with"
as Pickens asserts? Cp. 29) That is doubtful. Certainly he was a
national figure in that he was a member of the national legislature,
but presumably that is not what Pickens means. Instead some
national status with considerable recognition is a reasonable
interpretation. A simple test of Cutting's. national stature is the
coverage of his activities by the national news media. For example,
the Index to the New York Times for 1934 lists less than a dozen
references to Cutting. A few more are found in the 1935 Index,
as well as those under "New Mexico," part of which are crosslistings from the "Cutting" entry. The most mentioned topic for
both years is the challenge by Chavez to the outcome of the 1934
election. CAh, New Mexico politics where charges of election
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trickery never cease!) If Cutting were the "national figure to be
reckoned with," some indication of that status should have been
pronounced at his death. Although a lengthy Times obituary was
published no particular national significance was attributed to
Cutting. At the time of his death, Cutting was mentioned in a
Times editorial (May 8, 1935), but that statement stressed the
healthful benefits of the American Southwest, not Cutting's national prominence. Certainly in comparison with another U.S.
Senator from another minor state, Huey Long, Cutting was hardly
a nationalpower. Here, as in the case of FDR's presumed concern
about the 1934 election contest, Pickens has substantially exaggerated the attention and importance attached to New Mexico
politics by the nation as a whole. New Mexico politics are colorful and fascinating but ordinarily of only modest concern beyond
the state's borders.
CONCLUSION

PROBABLY the most insightful observation in the paper is on page
12, where Pickens analyzes the appeal of Cutting for Spanishspeaking voters. Among Anglo politicians, only David F. Cargo,
governor in the 1960's, had a comparable appeal. That Cutting
did not pose a threat to their leaders and that he did not compete
with those leaders for status within the Spanish-speaking community is an intriguing explanation of his success. The tables of
election results on page 24 demonstrate Cutting's drawing power
against Chavez in the Spanish precincts. The vote in these areas
with its conversion from Republican to Democratic sympathies
from the mid-twenties to Roosevelt's second term is a topic that a
future study might illuminate. That transformation may also hold
the clue to the sustained high voter turnout from 1932 to 1934.
The typical fall-off of votes in nonpresidential years did not occur
in 1934. 13 Why?
Much of the foregoing has been negative, but that is the nature
of a critique. No claim is made that definitive answers have been
found for the weaknesses detected in the paper. Instead these
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Raws have been noted with suggestions as to how they might be
reconciled. One might equate this critique with the report of a
building inspector who finds nails missing in the walls of a house.
If the house (Pickens' article) is to stand, it must have sufficient
nails driven into the studding so the structure won't collapse at
the first strong wind. Pickens needs to nail more firmly parts of
his argument.
.
Basically, this critique raises three general, sequential questions: First, what are the understandable expectations that should
apply to a situation, i.e., on the basis of what is already known
about a set of relations, such as Presidential-Congressional interaction? Second, are there grounds to anticipate that the situation
at hand would be different than the general situation, e.g., that
Roosevelt would endorse the opposition candidate, Cutting?
Third, what evidence is available to confirm or deny the speculation that this specific sItuation is an exception? This sequence of
questions-what should we expect? should we expect this situation
to be an exception to the general pattern? and what evidence supports the interpretation that this is an exception?-are applicable
to most of the criticisms made. The Pickens article is an excellent
illustration of the complexities of answering these questions.
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NOTES

I. NMHR, vol. 46 (1971), pp. 4-36.
2. Pickens characterizes Chavez as "more conservative" in this passage (pp. 6-7) but offers little evidence to support that evaluation. How
did Chavez's record compare with that of other members of Congress in
1933-34? Was he left or right of center? Left or right of Cutting? Fundamentally, the defect here is that Pickens does not specify what is meant
by conservative. At the very least, it is necessary to distinguish between
economic and civil liberties dimensions of conservatism. Apparently,
Pickens concentrates on the former. Pickens seems to classify Chavez on
the basis of his public statements. On that evidence, FDR in 1932 would
be conservative. Granted that public statements could be used to determine
ideological stance, Pickens fails to marshal persuasive evidence. It seems
highly questionable to rate Chavez more conservative than Cutting. These
misperceptions are frequently made, e.g., the comparison of T. E. (Gene)
Lusk with David F. Cargo in the 1966 New Mexico gubernatorial election.
3. Another Goodell disadvantage was that he had not been elected to
the Senate. As a replacement for Robert F. Kennedy, he was seeking to
hold the seat in his own right. Appointees to Senate vacancies have been
notably unsuccessful electorally in recent years, e.g., Edwin Mechem of
New Mexico in 1964.
4. The best known is Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, 1951, rev. ed. 1970).
5. It is true that presidents may remain neutral when party considerations dictate a partisan posture. Thus Democratic presidents in recent
years have failed to endorse opponents of leading Republicans, e.g., the
late Everett M. Dirksen when he was Senate Minority Leader. But the
Democratic presidents did not endorse Dirksen. Cutting's Senate role in
1934 was not as important as Dirksen's in the 1950's and 1960's.
6. If this line of thought is sound, the statement "It was years after
Bronson Cutting's death before reasonable speculation appeared concerning
Roosevelt's reason for endorsing the more conservative Chavez. . . ." (p. 6)
is superfluous.
7. The phrasing "political and not economic" (p. 15) is misleading. All
the issues mentioned in that paragraph are political as are most that confront legislators. It seems preferable to characterize the situation as one
about "power (or party control) not ideology."
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8. Perhaps one could dismiss this use of "votes" for "money" or "opinion leadership" as literary license. In that event little critical comment is in
order. That view seems uncharitable to the author and NMHR who offer
the study as a serious piece of scholarship.
9. Several reports of this anomaly appeared in the aftermath of the
1968 New Hampshire presidential primary. A summary of the situation
is found in Milton Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority: A Dove's Guide (New York, 1970), pp.
48-5°'
10. This partisan identification should have been more important in
1934 than today when, we are told, voters have become more independent
and less partisan. Of course, Pickens could choose to argue that New
Mexicans in 1934 were an exception to the partisan tendencies of the
period. What grounds would he use for that contention?
11. That this emphasis on state issues "did little to enhance his
(Chavez's) stature in the House of Representatives" is questionable. The
thrust of a Congressman's ideological views is probably irrelevant to his
stature in the House. That stature seems to be determined by the wisdom,
patience, and expertise a member demonstrates. For example, in the late
1950'S (Judge) Howard Smith (D-Va.) as House Rules Committee Chairman and Charles Halleck (R-Ind.) as House Minority Leader had impressive stature in the House. They were also defenders of their districts'
interests as are most Congressmen if they wish to be re-elected. In contrast, John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon never achieved any notable
stature within the chambers during their service in the two houses of
Congress. Of course, they attained national prominence in those capacities.
It is ,perhaps that" a national reputation, not stature in the house that
Pickensintends.
12. That Chavez was not always consistent in his pronouncements
and actions (fn. 71, p. 35) does not invalidate the contention that he had
a political philosophy. Each of us, especially politicians, has to choose
among imperfect alternatives. To cut taxes benefits constituents by
lowering the costs of government. But emergency appropriations may be
necessary to create jobs, which may also benefit one's constitu~nts. To
point this out is not to suggest that no criticism of Chavez can be made on
these grounds. No doubt, valid criticism can be made but this example is
not persuasive as it is presented.
13. 15°,000 votes were cast in the gubernatorial contests in both
years. The congressional race drew 148,000 votes each time, but the Cuting-Chavez contest attracted 151,000 votes. The 3,000 vote difference
between Chavez's 1932 and 1934 races is about the increase in the Spanish-
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speaking counties (p. 24). Increases and declines for the rest of the state
seem to cancel out each other. Why was Cutting so markedly popular in
San Miguel and Valencia counties? Note the anti-Spanish sumamevote
associated with the East Side (or Little Texas) counties is less noticeable
in 1934 than it is now. Or is it? This commentary on the election results is
not a criticism of Pickens' article. It merely suggests a theme that other
scholars may wish to follow in building upon Pickens' research.

